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Abstract 
 
This study investigated the role of provincial governance on the growth of per capita income of 
Vietnamese households, using a balanced panel dataset for the period 2012-2014. Whereas we 
found no evidence for the influence of provincial governance when a linear fixed-effect 
regression estimator was used, the results from a fixed-effect quantile regression estimator 
reveal that provincial governance has a positive effect on several groups (but not the poorest) 
and the effect tends to be greater for better-off households. In addition, we find that wage 
employment plays a larger role in the income growth of poorer households, while returns on 
education are higher for richer households. The findings suggest that a mean regression 
approach that looks only at the role of explanatory variables on mean household welfare and 
does not consider differences in the distribution of household welfare, may miss some 
heterogeneity that is of interest to policy makers.  
 
Keywords: fixed-effect quantile regression; household welfare; public governance; policy 
makers. 
JEL classifications: P48; P35; I3, O43.  
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1. Introduction 
Launched in 1986, the economic and political reforms known as “Đổi Mới” boosted economic 
growth and transformed Vietnam from one of the world’s poorest nations into a lower middle-
income country by 2010 (World Bank [WB] & Ministry of Planning and Investment [MPI], 
2016). The proportion of the Vietnamese population remaining below the national poverty line 
(GSO-WB Poverty line) dropped from about 60% in 1993 to 13.5% in 2014 (WB, 2017). More 
than 40 million people were moved out of poverty over the course of two decades (WB, 2013). 
In addition, Vietnam has made significant advances in other dimensions of well-being, ranging 
from high primary and secondary school enrolments to improvements in health status and 
reduced morbidity and mortality. Thus, the country has achieved, and in some cases surpassed, 
many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (WB, 2013). 
Numerous studies have examined the contribution of various factors to household 
welfare in Vietnam. In general, these studies often examine the role of distinguishing household 
characteristics or assets (land, migration, access to credit, nonfarm participation) (Nguyen & 
Daniel, 2012; Nguyen & Marrit, 2014; Nguyen & Tran, 2013; Pfau & Giang, 2009; Ravallion 
& Van de Walle, 2008) and community characteristics (infrastructure, natural and geographic 
conditions) (Bui, Dungey, Nguyen, & Pham, 2014; Tran, Nguyen, Van, & Nguyen, 2015) in 
improving household welfare.  Public governance can have a significant influence on the living 
standard of local people (Attride, 2002; Sáez, 2013) and in Vietnam, ensuring good governance 
is considered a prerequisite for reducing poverty and improving household welfare (Jairo, 
Nguyen, Tran, & Phung, 2015). To date, however, little is known about the role of local 
government in improving household welfare in Vietnam. 
Since provinces are largely autonomous in their implementation of policy reforms in 
Vietnam (Malesky, 2004; Tran, Huong, Doan, & Tran, 2016), there are large gaps between 
formal institutions established in law and the enforcement and compliance performance of the 
local authorities. The data show that the quality of governance and institutions across provinces 
has been uneven. While many provinces have made significant improvements in economic 
governance and business investment, others have lagged behind (Malesky, 2007; VCCI & 
USAID, 2016). The lack of empirical evidence on the role of local government in improving 
household welfare, combined with substantial differences in public governance across 
provinces, have motivated us to consider how and to what extent the quality of provincial 
governance affects household welfare. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first 
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attempt to apply micro-econometrics to investigate the role of provincial governance in the 
growth of household income in Vietnam.  
Our study has several strong points. First, using a balanced panel data set with fixed 
effect regression models allows us to control for unobservable household and province-specific 
effects which are invariant over time and can affect a household's income. Second, existing 
studies often investigate only the effect of public governance or institutions on household 
welfare at the mean using a mean regression approach (e.g., ordinary least squares or 
fixed/random effects estimators). This approach, however, may not capture heterogeneous 
effects, possibly because these may differ across points on the outcome distribution of 
households.  
To address this issue, our study applied a fixed-effect quantile regression model to 
consider the role of provincial governance at various points in the conditional distribution of 
household welfare. Whereas we found no evidence for the influence of provincial governance 
when a linear fixed-effect regression estimator was used, the results from a fixed-effect quantile 
regression estimator reveal that provincial governance has a positive effect on some quantiles 
considered but the effect seems to be greater for better-off households. The findings suggest 
that a mean regression approach that does not consider differences in the distribution of 
household welfare, may miss some heterogeneity of interest to policy makers.  
2. Theoretical and Empirical Evidence 
The present use of the concept of governance may be traced to a study on Africa by 
Mundial (1989), who defined governance as “the exercise of political power to manage a 
nation’s affairs.” The World Bank (1992) understood governance as “the manner in which 
power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for 
development.” In similar vein, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) defined governance as “the exercise of authority in government and the political 
arena.” According to their understanding, “good public governance helps to strengthen 
democracy and human rights, promote economic prosperity and social cohesion, reduce 
poverty, enhance environmental protection and the sustainable use of natural resources, and 
deepen confidence in government and public administration” (Tarschys, 2001, p. 28). Huther 
and Shah (2005) linked governance to the notion of institutions, defining governance as a 
“multifaceted concept encompassing all aspects of the exercise of authority through formal and 
informal institutions in the management of the resource endowment of a state” (Huther & Shah, 
2005, p. 40). 
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Institutionalists Krueger (1974) and North (1994, 1995) pointed out that good governance 
reduces transaction costs for economic activities. Stiglitz (2002) and other New-Keynesians 
indicated that transparent legal frameworks and clear tax policies enable the market to function 
effectively. According to Eric, Chetwynd, and Spector (2003), two theoretical models emerge 
from the research literature and explain the role of good public governance in improving income 
and poverty reduction.  
The “economic model” postulates that good public governance increases economic 
investment, reduces market distortions, promotes competition, and improves efficiencies by 
reducing the cost of doing business. In turn, these encourage economic growth and poverty 
reduction.  
The “governance model,” on the other hand, asserts that good public governance 
improves the institutional capacity of government to deliver quality public services, increase 
public investment in major public demands, enhance compliance with safety and health 
regulations, and reduce budgetary pressures on government. Good public governance, in turn, 
increases social capital and public trust in governmental institutions, and expands public 
resources available to implement effective economic development programs, enhancing the 
capability of government to help its citizens, particularly the poor. Thus, improving governance, 
at both national and international levels, is important for the development of poor countries 
(Brinkerhoff, 2008). There is also increasing consensus that good governance is vital for human 
development (UNDP, 2011a).  
The relationship between governance, public administration and development progress 
has been a main concern in the research on developing countries (Jairo et al., 2015). In 
consequence of the presence of comparable units of analysis, most large-scale studies that 
utilize econometric and statistical methods use national-level data to examine the effect of key 
governance variables on development progress. On the macro level, any study of governance 
as a unit of analysis initially focuses narrowly on the association between governance and 
economic growth (Sáez, 2013). Seminal work by Barro (1991) employed a cross-national study 
to regress economic growth on a number of country characteristics (e.g., government 
consumption expenditure, public investment in education, and political instability). The main 
finding from this study was that political instability and a high ratio of government consumption 
expenditure to GDP had a negative effect on income growth.  
Campos and Nugent (1999) evaluated the extent to which governance affects some 
indicators of development progress, namely per capita income, infant mortality rate and the 
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illiteracy rate. Governance is measured by a set of institutional factors: (i) accountability; (ii) a 
strong civil society; (iii) bureaucratic quality; (iv) rule of law. In their study, ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS) models were used with the data from a sample of 21 Latin American 
countries (LACs) and 8 Southeast and East Asian countries (SEACs).1 The regression results 
show that the last three indicators are positively associated with the real per capita income for 
the whole sample. However, looking at each region, only the strong civil society factor has a 
positive relationship with income per capita in the SEACs, while only bureaucratic quality and 
the rule of law have a positive linkage with per capita income in LACs. Similar findings were 
also observed for the case of infant mortality and illiteracy rates. The results suggest that the 
relationship between governance and development progress might be different across regions 
and countries.   
Hasan, Mitra, and Ulubasoglu (2007) re-examined the association between poverty and 
institutions to test if governance, political freedom, and the ease of doing business, among other 
indicators of institutions, affect cross-country poverty rates. Their main finding was that good 
governance, as measured by a strong commitment to the rule of law, among other measures, 
matters for poverty reduction, mainly through its influence on economic growth. Though not a 
panacea, less cumbersome regulations governing private sector operations, especially those 
pertaining to starting a business, can directly affect economic growth as well as poverty 
reduction. In addition, their study finds that political freedom is not linked with either higher 
growth or lower poverty. Combined, the findings imply that good governance and regulations 
supporting the establishment of new firms are more relevant for growth and poverty reduction 
than the nature of the political system. 
Haq, Zia, and Arif (2006) examined whether there was an association between good 
governance and pro-poor growth in Pakistan from 1996 to 2005. The authors employed three 
broad indicators of governance: (i) political governance (i.e., voice and accountability, political 
instability and violence); (ii) economic governance (i.e., government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality); and (iii) institutional dimensions of governance (i.e., rule of law, control of 
corruption). Haq et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between governance and poverty (as 
well as governance and income inequality) using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions. Their main finding is that voice, accountability, and political stability are 
negatively and significantly associated with poverty. By combining macro data (states) and 
                                           
1 Socialist and transitioning nations, such as China, Cuba, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet 
Nam, were excluded from the sample. 
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micro data (child poverty) with multilevel regression models, Daoud (2015) investigated the 
association between the quality of local governance and absolute child poverty across states in 
India. His study found that controlling for all other factors, households living in a state with 
better local governance were more likely to escape child poverty, while those living in a state 
with more corruption were more likely to suffer from child poverty. 
Substantial gaps in the quality of governance and institutions and in economic 
development across provinces have inspired few studies using provincial data levels in Vietnam 
to test if the quality of governance is associated with the living standard of the population. For 
instance, there is a positive association between the Human Development Index (HDI) and the 
Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) (UNDP, 2011b). Ha and Hanh (2013) also 
found that provincial governance (PCI and PAPI) can have a positive effect on GDP per capita 
at the provincial level. It should be noted, however, that using aggregate data, cross-province 
studies are likely to provide biased estimates because of their failure to control for the 
heterogeneity of household characteristics (Blundell & Stoker, 2005). As these writers have 
noted (Blundell & Stoker, p. 3), “for any application, a model must be specified which captures 
all important economic effects, allows for relevant individual heterogeneity, and bridges the 
gap between individual and aggregate, facilitating analysis at both levels.” In the current study, 
we applied a micro-econometric approach with a balanced panel data set to examine the role of 
provincial governance in improving household welfare, accounting for heterogeneity in 
household characteristics. 
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Data 
In this study, household data were taken from the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
(VHLSS) of 2012 and 2014. The VHLSSs were conducted by the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam (GSO) with technical assistance from the World Bank. Each VHLSS covers around 
9,400 households. The VHLSSs are representative at the national and regional levels (Vietnam 
is divided into six geographic and eight economic regions). Data on households and individuals 
include basic demography, employment and labour force participation, education, health, 
income, expenditure, housing, fixed assets and durable goods, and participation of households 
in poverty alleviation programs. It may be added that the 2012 and 2014 VHLSSs set up a 
balanced panel of around 4,200 households.  
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Table 1  
Ten Composite Sub-Indices of the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) 
1. Market entry costs for business start-up;  
2. Access to land and security of business premises; 
3. Transparent business environment and equitable business information;   
4. Informal charges;  
5. Time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and inspections;  
6. Restrictions marginalising private activity due to policy biases toward state-owned and foreign-owned 
businesses;2  
7. Proactive, creative provincial leadership in problem solving for businesses;  
8. Business support services;  
9. Labour training policies and regulations; 
10. Fair and effective legal procedures for dispute resolution.  
Source: (VCCI & USAID, 2016). 
In this study, the quality of provincial governance is measured by the Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (PCI), an aggregate performance indicator that evaluates and ranks the 
quality of economic governance by provincial authorities in creating a favourable business 
environment for the development of the private sector (Table 1). The PCI has been collected 
annually by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) since 2007 with support 
from USAID.3 The survey covers all 63 provinces in Vietnam. Briefly, the PCI methodology 
was conducted in a three-step sequence: (i) gather data from business surveys and published 
documents, (ii) compute ten sub-indices and standardize to a 10-point scale, and (iii) adjust the 
composite PCI as the weighted mean of nine sub-indices with a maximum score of 100 points 
(VCCI & USAID, 2016). The combination of the VHLSSs and PCI surveys offers a unique 
household-provincial level panel dataset. This balanced panel dataset enables us to measure the 
impact of provincial governance on the growth of household income, accounting for household 
characteristics at the household level. 
3.2. Model specifications 
Since household income is considered to be one of the standard measures of household 
economic welfare (Deaton, 1997), household welfare is measured by household per capita 
income in the current study. We assume household welfare is a reduced function of provincial 
governance and of household characteristics, as follows:  
                                           
2 This sub-index was even mentioned in the PCI’s official documentation but there is no data available on 
their website to download, so in this study we use the overall PCI.  
3 For the sampling and methodology of the survey, see http://eng.pcivietnam.org/uploads/96646-
PCI%20USER%20GUIDE_Final_Website.pdf  
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0 1 2 3ijy tijt jt ij ijtt X PCI Year u                                            (1) 
where ijy t  is the annual per capita income of household i in province j in the year t; ijtX is a 
vector of household distinguishing characteristics, such as demographic variables and assets; 
jtPCI  is the measurement of the quality of public governance at province j; tYear  is the dummy 
variable of the year 2014. In equation (1), unobserved variables are decomposed into time 
invariant component iju 4, and time-variant component ijt . Equation (1) was estimated using 
a fixed-effect estimator with a balanced panel dataset of households and the PCI in 2012 and 
2014. This approach allows the researcher to remove the influence of time-invariant 
unobservable regional, household and individual characteristics that can affect household 
welfare (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). According to Wooldridge (2013), with the assumption of 
strict exogeneity for the explanatory variables, using a fixed effect estimator in equation (1) 
yields unbiased estimates. Broadly speaking, the idiosyncratic error ijt should be uncorrelated 
with each explanatory variable across all time periods.  
A mean approach using standard linear regression techniques (e.g., ordinary least 
squares or fixed/random effects estimators) provides a methodology commonly used for 
considering the influence of public governance or institution on household welfare or 
development indicators (e.g., Azfar & Gurgur, 2008; Barro, 1991; Campos & Nugent, 1999; 
Hasan et al., 2007; Sáez, 2013). The mean approach looks at the average relationship between 
governance and household welfare based on the conditional mean of the outcome distribution. 
This gives us only a partial view of the relationship. However, quantile regression enables us 
to examine the relationship at different points in the conditional distribution of household 
welfare (Buchinsky, 1994).  
Several studies (e.g., Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Li, Squire, & Zou, 1998) found a public 
governance heterogeneous effect across levels of development. Thus, we employed a fixed 
effects quantile regression estimator to test whether the effect of provincial governance quality 
differs for households with varying levels of household per capita income. The quantile 
estimator also provides a richer characterization of the data, allowing us to study the effect of 
                                           
4 The variable iju captures all unobserved, time-constant factors that affect household welfare (the fact that iju
has no t subscript shows that it does not vary over time). Generically, iju is called an unobserved effect and it is 
also common in applied research to find iju referred to as a fixed effect. In application, we might also see iju
referred to as unobserved heterogeneity (or individual/household heterogeneity) (Woolridge, 2013). 
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the quality of public governance on the entire distribution of household welfare, not merely its 
conditional mean (Koenker & Hallock, 2001). In addition, a quantile regression estimator is 
more robust to non-normal errors and outliers, while a linear regression estimator can suffer 
from inefficiency if the errors are highly abnormal (Koenker, 2005; Ha & Tran, 2017).  
In the current study, we applied Canay’s method (2011) to estimate a fixed-effect 
quantile regression model. First, the conditional mean of ˆiju  is estimated from equation (1) 
using a fixed effects estimator. Second, a new dependent variable is computed as the difference 
between the original dependent variable and ˆiju : ijy t = ijy t - ˆiju . Finally, a fixed-effects quantile 
regression estimator was estimated for equation (2), where   denotes the corresponding 
quantiles of dependent variables. Standard errors are estimated using bootstrap techniques with 
1,000 replications. Under certain assumptions discussed in Canay (2011), this estimator is 
asymptotically consistent.      

yijQuantile X PCI Yearijt jt tt       
 
  
         (2) 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Background information on household characteristics and provincial governance 
This section provides some basic information about key variables used in the estimation. On 
average, there is an overall improvement in PCI with scores from 58 to 59.3 over the study 
period (Table 2). Table 3 indicates the top 10 provinces with the highest achievement in 
improving the PCI over the period 2012-2014. It also lists the 10 provinces that showed the 
lowest improvement in the PCI over the same period. Tuyen Quang province’s PCI increased 
by about 15.5% (7.4) while that of An Giang province declined by 8.4% (-5.3). The PCI data 
show that some provinces have high PCI scores while others are skewed to the left of the score 
distribution (Figure 1). Some provinces improved their scores even though their score was still 
relatively lower than that of others.  
Table 2  
Weighted Mean of PCI Sub-Indices for Wage Earning Sample 
Year Entry 
cost 
Land 
access 
Trans-
parency 
Time 
cost 
Informal 
charge 
Bias Proac
tive 
Business 
support 
Labour 
training 
Legal PCI 
2012 8.66 6.34 5.87 5.82 6.55 NA 4.65 4.26 5.22 3.65 57.9 
2014 8.10 5.64 6.21 6.46 5.10 5.02 4.39 5.93 6.24 5.62 59.3 
Source: PCI 2012, 2014. NA: not available. Estimates from 63 provinces. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of PCI between 2012-2014.  
 
             
Source: Authors’ calculation from PCI 2012, 2014. 
Table 3  
Provinces Showing Greatest and Smallest Improvement in PCI Between 2012-2014 
Province 2014 PCI 2014 Rank 2014 Change in score % change 
Top 10 provinces with the greatest improvement in PCI between 2012-2014 
An Giang 58.1 37 -5.32 -8.40% 
Dong Nai 57.26 42 -5.03 -8.10% 
Tra Vinh 58.58 32 -4.17 -6.60% 
Son La 55.28 49 -3.71 -6.30% 
Vinh Long 59.54 21 -3.43 -5.40% 
Bac Lieu 59.5 22 -3.35 -5.30% 
Binh Phuoc 59.72 17 -3.34 -5.30% 
Hau Giang 58.91 25 -3.1 -5.00% 
Ung Yen 55.14 51 -2.87 -4.90% 
Ninh Thuan 56.88 43 -2.88 -4.80% 
Top 10 provinces with the least improvement in PCI between 2012-2014 
Ha Nam 56.57 45 4.65 8.90% 
Binh Thuan 59.16 23 5.08 9.40% 
Thanh Hoa 60.33 12 5.22 9.50% 
Ha Noi 58.89 26 5.49 10.30% 
Lam Dong 58.79 29 5.95 11.20% 
Dien Bien 50.32 63 5.20 11.50% 
Nam Dinh 58.52 33 6.29 12.00% 
Vinh Phuc 61.81 6 6.66 12.20% 
Tay Ninh 59.62 19 7.67 14.80% 
Tuyen Quang 55.2 50 7.39 15.50% 
      Source: PCI 2012, 2014.  
 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
D
en
sit
y
45 50 55 60 65
PCI 2012
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
en
sit
y
50 55 60 65 70
PCI 2014
  
12 
 
Table 4  
Statistical Summary of Key Variables Used in the Estimation 
 
Year 2012 2014 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Quality of provincial governance     
Provincial competitiveness index (score) 57.07 3.99 58.33 3.00 
Household welfare     
Annual household per capita income (in thousands of 
VND) 24,420 25,156 30,168 33,680 
Poverty incidence (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 
Poverty gap (percentage of income shortfall relative to the 
poverty line) 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 
Household characteristics     
Gender of household head 
(1=male; 0=female) 0.76 0.43 0.75 0.43 
Age of household head (years) 49.87 14.03 51.36 13.85 
Ethnicity of household head (1=major; 0=minor) 0.83 0.38 0.83 0.37 
Marital status of household head (1=married; 
0=unmarried) 0.98 0.15 0.98 0.15 
Household head, years of schooling (years) 8.18 4.04 8.20 4.02 
Household size (number of household members) 3.93 1.53 3.84 1.59 
Dependency ratio (number of dependents in the 
household)a 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.30 
Wage employment (1 if the household has wage income; 
0=no wage income) 0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 
Nonfarm self-employment (1 if the household has 
nonfarm-self-employment income; 0=not) 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 
Land holding per household     
Cropland, annual (m2) 2,887 6,108 2,895 6,776 
Cropland, perennial (m2) 1,054 4,319 1,128 5,157 
Forestry land (m2) 1,544 10,442 1,558 13,117 
Regions (% of households in each region)  
Urban (1=urban; 0=rural) 0.29 0.30 
Red River Delta (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 0.20 0.20 
East Northern Mountains (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 0.13 0.13 
West Northern Mountains (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 0.07 0.07 
North Central Coast (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 0.11 0.11 
South Central Coast (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 0.09 0.09 
Central Highlands (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 0.07 0.07 
Southeast (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 0.14 0.14 
Mekong Delta (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 0.20 0.20 
Observations  4169 4152 
Note a: Dependents include young dependents (under 15) and old dependents (women over 59 and men 
over 64). Average exchange rate (USD/VND) was 20,919 in 2012 and 21,259 in 2014. 
Source: Authors’ calculation from VHLSS 2012-2014 and PCI 2012-2014. The poverty rate was 
estimated using the official poverty line 2012-2014 (GSO, 2015). 
 
The statistical summary of variables is given in Table 4. It should be noted that the PCI 
mean in Table 4 is calculated on the basis of household samples, while in Table 2 this is 
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estimated with observations from 63 provinces. The data indicate that on average, each 
household member earned about 2,035 thousand Vietnamese dong (VND) per month in 2012 
and 2,514 thousand VND per month in 2014. The poverty head count index (poverty rate) also 
decreased from about 9% in 2012 to around 8% in 2012, while the poverty gap remained almost 
unchanged. The sample data reveal that about 30% of households live in urban areas while 70% 
live in rural areas. Most households lived in the Red River Delta and the Southeast region, 
accounting for about 40% of the total sample. 
The poorest region is located in the West Northern Mountains, with monthly per capita 
income being estimated at about 1,134 thousand VND in 2012 and 1,660 thousand VND in 
2014. Households living in the Southeast region are the richest, with per capita income at about 
2,650 thousand VND per month and around 3,400 thousand VND in 2012 and 2014, 
respectively. On average, each household member in urban areas earned about 2,094 thousand 
VND in 2012 and 3,500 thousand VND in 2014, whereas each household member in rural areas 
earned only about 1,660 thousand VND and 2,080 thousand VND for the same period.  
 
 
3.2. Determinants of household welfare  
Model 1 in Table 5 reports the results from the income model using a fixed-effect estimator. 
It shows that the size of the PCI coefficient is about 48 thousand Vietnamese Dong (VND), not 
statistically significant at the conventional level of 10% (p-value =0.71). Thus, we can conclude 
that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the quality of provincial governance 
affects per capita income at the mean. A different picture emerged, however, when a fixed-
effect quantile regression model was applied. As can be seen in Model 2 and Figure 2, local 
governance has a positive and statistically significant effect on household per capita income for 
all quantiles except the tenth.  
The effect is heterogeneous across the quantiles considered, however, and tends to be larger 
for households with per capita income above the median. Specifically, holding all other factors 
constant, an increase of one point in the PCI would lead to an increase of 60 thousand VND in 
annual per capita income for those at the median. The corresponding figures for those at the 
75th and 90th quantiles are about 81 thousand VND and 122 thousand VND, respectively. These 
results suggest that a mean regression approach has obscured the role of good governance in 
improving household welfare at different points of outcome distribution. Our results have thus 
moved toward reconciling the findings of previous studies reported in the literature. 
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Interestingly, our research finding reveals that the quality of local governance plays a larger 
role in the income growth of richer households. The greater impact of provincial governance 
on richer households may be explained by the fact that better-off households have more 
resources with which to seize economic opportunities provided by improvement in local 
economic governance, which in turn can lead to higher income growth.   
 
Figure 2: Slope and 90% coefficient intervals for quantile treatment regression. 
Source: authors’ calculation from the VHLSSs and the PCI 2012-2014. 
Note: Figure 2 reflects the varying effects of provincial governance on per capita income across different points 
in the distribution of income and also indicates that the effect is greater for better-off households.  
Household size had a negative effect on per capita income in both models in Table 5. This 
finding is in line with several studies in rural Honduras (Jansen, Pender, Damon, Wielemaker, 
& Schipper, 2006) and peri-urban Vietnam (Tran, Lim, Cameron, & Van, 2014), which show 
that having more dependent members, and more family members in general, seems to reduce 
per capita income. Keeping all other variables constant, Model 1 shows that an additional family 
member results in a decrease in annual per capita income of about 2,643 thousand VND. The 
positive sign of the age of the household head and the negative sign of its squared term suggest 
that the age of the household head has a diminishing impact on per capita income.  
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Table 5  
Determinants of Household per Capita Income 
 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 
Linear Fixed-
Effect 
Estimator 
Model 2             
Fixed-Effects Simultaneous Quantile Regression Estimator       
 
10th Quantile 25th Quantile 50th Quantile 75th Quantile 90th Quantile 
PCI  48.249 26.194 58.514** 61.106*** 81.111*** 121.820*** 
 (128.300) (40.094) (24.294) (13.994) (24.460) (41.014) 
Urban 4,202.931 2,737.856*** 3,878.804*** 4,348.978*** 4,398.399*** 5,503.781*** 
 (3,574.678) (449.239) (248.470) (134.843) (245.638) (405.393) 
Gender -7,036.009* -6,569.327*** -6,751.569*** -6,733.623*** -6,688.751*** -6,905.624*** 
 (4,138.810) (380.888) (216.697) (133.048) (231.312) (368.105) 
Age 732.177** 591.770*** 647.517*** 720.490*** 785.619*** 867.571*** 
 (351.487) (73.489) (37.464) (22.739) (39.569) (59.325) 
Age squared -5.795* -4.570*** -5.032*** -5.675*** -6.185*** -6.879*** 
 (3.036) (0.697) (0.358) (0.210) (0.378) (0.571) 
Ethnicity 913.615 -523.931 318.778 855.971*** 1,298.753*** 2,132.063*** 
 (2,318.397) (387.781) (208.557) (144.929) (207.429) (312.234) 
Marital status -26.453 1,830.094 1,001.600** -28.699 -770.281* -1,200.851 
 (3,247.906) (1,408.867) (421.214) (315.986) (444.221) (1,286.601) 
Schooling years 502.918** 292.871*** 389.333*** 492.905*** 593.324*** 751.418*** 
 (225.707) (45.665) (22.790) (13.483) (22.663) (39.556) 
Household size -2,642.740*** -2,244.935*** -2,449.322*** -2,599.172*** -2,747.446*** -2,916.468*** 
 (397.604) (106.574) (51.328) (35.644) (65.630) (98.940) 
Dependency ratio -3,242.060 -144.128 -2,035.245*** -3,312.393*** -4,701.621*** -6,808.457*** 
 (2,028.065) (747.621) (330.154) (236.796) (355.788) (658.540) 
Wage employment 2,504.514*** 3,619.445*** 3,053.386*** 2,448.163*** 1,989.234*** 592.289 
 (863.973) (325.368) (193.980) (122.746) (221.032) (370.342) 
Nonfarm self-
employment 
3,128.546*** 1,642.368*** 2,622.016*** 3,093.737*** 3,469.594*** 4,462.368*** 
 (998.445) (402.773) (204.129) (125.109) (207.732) (392.233) 
Annual land (log) 159.670 221.619*** 192.770*** 171.516*** 132.025*** 111.179*** 
 (161.834) (45.987) (25.491) (16.398) (26.984) (40.613) 
Perennial land (log) 321.152*** 162.532*** 245.649*** 307.471*** 363.612*** 442.688*** 
 (124.234) (53.237) (29.974) (20.724) (29.024) (52.618) 
Forestry land (log) 435.628** 470.305*** 414.836*** 390.018*** 408.728*** 404.544*** 
 (198.956) (38.310) (25.792) (16.471) (30.032) (41.927) 
Year dummy 2014 5,125.969*** 4,301.487*** 3,714.260*** 4,258.306*** 3,599.444*** 4,042.201*** 
 (484.900) (331.348) (165.421) (122.505) (161.184) (268.294) 
Constant 8,080.828 6,333.994** 7,272.941*** 7,800.167*** 8,129.843*** 7,410.027*** 
 (13,477.485) (2,962.199) (1,650.650) (1,029.361) (1,640.945) (2,845.714) 
R-squared 0.09      
Pseudo R2  0.200 0.300 0.37 0.36 0.31 
Observations 7,812 7,812 7,812 7,812 7,812 7,812 
Number of id 4,257 4,257 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses in             
Model 1 and bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses in Model 2. Log stands for natural logarithm. 
Surprisingly, the results from the fixed-effect estimator reveal that on average, male-led 
households have lower per capita income than female-led households, even after controlling for 
all other factors. This finding is also found in Vietnam (Ghai, 2000) and several African 
countries (Djurfeldt, Djurfeldt, & Lodin, 2013; Appleton, 1996) but contradicts the common 
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conclusion of many studies from other parts of the world that indicate that female-led 
households are poorer than male-led households (Oginni, Ahonsi, & Ukwuije, 2013).  
In both models, we found that the education of the household head had an increasing effect 
on per capita income.  Keeping all other factors constant, Model 1 shows that on average, an 
additional year of schooling would raise per capita income by about 500 thousand VND. This 
result accords with recent findings in Vietnam (Doan, Le, & Tran, 2016; Tran, 2015b; Tran et 
al., 2014). Nevertheless, the estimates in Model 2 show that the effect tends to be greater for 
higher quantiles, suggesting that the return on education is higher for better-off households.  
The results from the fixed effect estimator indicate that nonfarm participation has a 
positive effect on household income. As shown in Model 1, Table 5, the coefficient of wage 
employment indicates that on average, keeping all other variables constant, households that 
took up wage employment would have a per capita income level 2,500 thousand VND higher 
than those without wage employment. The corresponding figures for those with nonfarm self-
employment were 3,130 thousand VND. In general, this finding also accords with that of Pham, 
Anh Tuan, and Thanh (2010) and Tran (2015a) in Vietnam and other developing countries 
(Rigg, 2006). Interestingly, the results from the fixed effects quantile regression estimator 
suggest that the influence of nonfarm participation on household income differs across the 
percentiles. Specifically, the effect of wage employment tends to be greater for poorer 
households, while nonfarm self-employment seems to contribute more income for richer 
households. This heterogeneity effect, however, might not be found by using a mean regression 
approach. 
Regarding the role of assets in household income, the study found that while annual land 
has no association with per capita income at the mean, it has a positive association with per 
capita income at all points of the income percentiles considered in Model 2. Having more 
perennial land is linked with the growth of per capita income at the mean in Model 1 as well as 
at all quantiles in Model 2. However, the effect of perennial land seems greater for those in 
higher quantiles. This suggests that land still plays an important role in Vietnam, where about 
two thirds of the population live in rural areas and about 45% of the labour force is found in 
agriculture (Tarp, Vinh and Tuan, 2017).  Finally, the 2014-year dummy coefficient indicates 
that per capita income is much higher (5,126 thousand VND) in 2014 than in the base year, 
2012.  
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4. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we examine the effect of the quality of provincial governance on household 
welfare, using a balanced panel data set from VHLSSs and the PCI in 2012 and 2014. The 
quality of provincial governance is measured by the Provincial Competitiveness Index, while 
household welfare is proxied by household per capita income. Both fixed effect and quantile 
fixed effect regression estimators were used to investigate the impact of provincial governance 
on household welfare. This approach allowed us to consider the role of local governance on the 
entire distribution of household welfare, not merely its conditional mean. Using fixed-effect 
regression estimators also enabled us to minimize endogeneity bias by controlling for 
unobserved and time-invariant factors that can affect household welfare.  
We find no evidence for the impact of provincial governance on household welfare when 
a linear fixed-effect regression model is used. In contrast, we find a positive effect of provincial 
governance on household welfare at some points in the distribution of per capita income. 
Interestingly, the effect differs substantially across quantiles and is higher for quantiles above 
the median. Thus, the finding implies that good governance tends to provide greater benefits to 
richer households than to other groups. While we remain aware of the difficulties of definitively 
establishing causation between governance and household welfare, the strength of our findings 
is supportive of a link. The established literature discusses numerous channels through which 
good governance can affect household welfare. In our study, the greater effect on richer 
households may be explained by the fact that these households owned more resources, enabling 
them to seize economic opportunities afforded by improvement in local economic governance, 
which in turn can help them to achieve higher income growth. While the effect of good 
governance has a positive effect on income growth for several quantiles, this is not the case for 
the poorest (those in the 10th percentile). The reason may be that lack of resources prevents the 
poor from taking advantage of the improved business environment to enhance their economic 
welfare.  
Using a quantile regression approach has allowed the current study to provide new insight 
into the role of household-related factors in household welfare.  Whereas the positive effects of 
wage and nonfarm self-employment are reported in most studies in Vietnam, our study reveals 
that wage employment is much more important for the economic welfare of poorer households, 
and nonfarm self-employment tends to contribute more income for better-off households.  In 
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addition, we find that the return on education is higher for richer households. We also find that 
having more land results in income growth for all groups, although the proportion of agriculture 
in total household income has declined significantly in Vietnam over the past decade (GSO, 
2015).  
We acknowledge that our study has some limitations. A problem in estimating the effect 
of the quality of provincial governance is encountered in the unobservable characteristics and 
potential endogeneity of provincial governance. In the current study, we used fixed-effect 
regressions to eliminate unobserved time-invariant variables that can cause endogeneity bias. 
The traditional method for dealing with endogeneity is the instrumental variables (IV) method. 
Practically speaking, it is not easy to find a good instrument which is not associated with 
household welfare but strongly affects the quality of provincial governance (Wooldridge, 
2013). We believe that the endogeneity bias may well be negligible after removing unobserved 
time-invariant variables and controlling for observed variables. However, this issue suggests 
that future research should use the instrumental variables method to account for potentially 
endogenous regressors.  
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